Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations? by Estrin, Saul et al.
1 
 
Which Institutions Encourage Entrepreneurial 
Growth Aspirations? 
Saul Estrin
a
,  Julia Korosteleva
b
, Tomasz Mickiewicz
c 
 
a
London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE,UK;  
Tel. +44 (0)207955 6629; Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6837; E-mail: S.Estrin@lse.ac.uk;  
corresponding author. 
b
University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK;  
Tel. +44 (0)20 7679 8770; Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 8777; E-mail: J.Korosteleva@ucl.ac.uk,  
c
 Aston University, Aston Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET; Tel. +44 (0)121 204 3007;  
Fax: +44 (0)121 204 3696; E-mail: T.Mickiewicz@aston.ac.uk. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank Paul Reynolds for advice on the consolidated Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Adult Population Survey Data Set: 2001-2006. We are also grateful to Zoltan Acs, Gian Fazio, 
Oleh Havrylyshyn, Philipp Koellinger, Wim Naudé, Paul Reynolds, Gerard Roland, David 
Smallbone, László Szerb, Friederike Welter, the participants in London’s University College and 
Imperial College workshops on entrepreneurship, of the annual ASSA/ACES conferences in San 
Francisco and Denver, of the Academy of Management Conference in Chicago, Babson College 
Entrepreneurial Research Conference in Syracuse and a University of Staffordshire seminar for 
comments and criticism. The three anonymous referees and our editor, Simon Parker, gave us 
thorough and valuable comments, yet all remaining errors are our own. The authors’ names are 
listed in alphabetical order for convenience. This was a fully collaborative effort.  
 
May 9
th
 2012, forthcoming in Journal of Business Venturing 
2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain entrepreneurial growth 
aspirations across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses at 
the national level about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights 
and greater government activity on entrepreneurs’ aspirations to increase employment. We further 
explore whether individual’s social networks compensate for weaknesses in national institutions. 
We use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys in 42 countries for 2001-2006, applying a 
multilevel estimation framework to test our ideas.  We find that the relationship between growth 
aspiring entrepreneurs and institutions is complex; they benefit simultaneously from strong 
government (in the sense of property rights enforcement), and smaller government, but are 
constrained by corruption. Social networks mediate some but not all institutional deficiencies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely appreciated that forms of entrepreneurial activity will be national-context specific 
and related to the character of institutions (see Batjargal, 2003; Hwang and Powell, 2005; Sobel, 
2008; Boettke and Coyne, 2009). This is because, as Baumol (1990, 1993) identified, institutions 
create the structure of incentives determining the choice of entrepreneurship as against other 
occupations, and the type of entrepreneurship chosen. However, the literature to date has been 
fairly general with respect both to the forms of entrepreneurship and types of institution under 
consideration and more fine grained analysis is needed concerning both. Thus, there is little 
consensus about precisely which institutions are important for entrepreneurship; recent work 
illustrates a variety of different frameworks and measures (Desai et al, 2003; Acs et al., 2008; 
Bowen and de Clercq, 2008; Aidis et al., 2012). At the same time, the institutions favouring self-
employment or very small firms might be different to those underpinning the formation of new 
ventures which plan to grow to considerable scale. Our attention is on the latter, because of their 
potential significance for economic growth, development and employment creation (Acs, 2006; 
Hessels et al., 2008; Minniti and Levesque, 2010, Autio and Acs, 2010).  Indeed, a public policy 
which focuses on promoting entrepreneurship in general, but not on high growth firms, is likely to 
be ineffective in enhancing employment. Moreover, differences in entrepreneurial ambitions play a 
critical role: environmental factors may affect entrepreneurial attitudes and growth ambitions 
negatively, creating ‘the Upas Tree’ effect (van Stel and Storey, 2004).  
The match between theories of entrepreneurship and the empirical testing of associated 
hypotheses is a non-trivial issue also because entrepreneurship itself is often measured imperfectly 
(Parker, 2009). Thus empirical researchers have been on occasion found themselves combining a 
variety of types of entrepreneurs: necessity and opportunity; self-employed, small and medium size 
enterprises. We agree with Autio (2011: 251) that high growth aspiration entrepreneurship fits best 
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“with the profile of entrepreneurs inferred from economic theories”, and represents the group most 
likely to create jobs and to attract the interest of policy makers. However, almost no work 
addresses the determinants of entrepreneur’s growth aspirations across institutional contexts. Thus 
Autio (2005, 2007) provides insights about cross-country patterns of high growth aspiration 
entrepreneurial activity, its associations with the national entrepreneurial environment, and 
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, but does not offer testable implications regarding their 
determinants. Bowen and De Clercq (2008) consider the impact of institutions on entrepreneurs’ 
intentions to create larger firms but do not consider micro level factors. Autio and Acs (2010) and 
Autio (2011) explain entrepreneurs’ individual and country level expected employment but each 
study considers a single institution; intellectual property rights (IPR) and low-level regulation 
respectively. 
Addressing this gap in the literature, we therefore develop a framework to analyse how the 
institutional context acts on entrepreneurs’ ambitions to expand their young businesses to a 
significant size. We offer a conceptual framework to consider the differing impacts on 
entrepreneurial growth aspirations of a variety of key institutions, and the relationship between 
them, as well as exploring whether individuals’ social networks can ameliorate the negative effects 
of weak institutions.  Our discussion of institutions augments Williamson (2000) and the ideas of 
social micro level structures from Granovetter (1985) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) to identify 
institutions and social structures of particular significance for the growth aspirations of 
entrepreneurs
1. We enhance Williamson’s “hierarchy of institutions “to identify the fundamental 
institutions likely to influence entrepreneurial growth aspirations and propose three related 
institutional hypotheses concerning the impact of corruption, the strength of property rights and the 
size of the government respectively. We also suggest ways that these macro-level structures may be 
                                                 
1
Thus while our conceptual work is based on new institutional economics theory by North (1990), Baumol (1990) and 
Williamson (2000), it also incorporates elements of sociological institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan (1977); 
Granovetter (1985); Powell and DiMaggio (1991); Suchman (1995); Deephouse (1996); Batjargal (2010)). 
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moderated by local social ties, to explore whether local social structures can compensate in 
situations when institutional contexts are deficient.  
We test the hypotheses derived from this framework using multi-level modelling methods on 
a large cross country cross individual dataset over time comprising a minimum of 2,000 people in 
each of 42 countries between 2001 and 2006. We find that the relationship between growth 
aspiring entrepreneurs and institutions is complex; they benefit simultaneously from strong 
government (in the sense of property rights enforcement), and smaller government, but are 
constrained by corruption. Social networks mediate some but not all of these institutional 
deficiencies. 
 
2. Growth aspirations of entrepreneurs: theory and hypotheses 
 
North (1990) proposed that many of the incentives underlying value-adding behaviour 
depend on the quality of institutions. He distinguishes between formal institutions, the laws and 
rules that define the economic incentives guiding individual and organisational choices, and 
informal institutions, the social arrangements and norms that influence how formal institutions 
operate in practice. His argument can be applied to entrepreneurial organisations, which adapt their 
strategies to fit the opportunities and limitations defined by the institutional context (Hwang and 
Powell, 2005; Boettke and Coyne, 2009). Thus, a functional business environment provides 
positive incentives for entrepreneurs while a weak one is likely to be deleterious (Baumol, 1993; 
Davidsson and Henrekson, 2002; Harper, 2003; van Stel and Storey, 2004). Delving more deeply 
into institutions, Williamson (2000) categorises them into a four level hierarchy, each level placing 
constraints on the ones below. He places informal institutions (customs, traditions and religious 
norms) -social embeddedness - at the top of the hierarchy because these are the deepest rooted and 
the slowest changing. This applies to entrepreneurship; for Baumol and Strom (2007), the most 
important example of an institution likely to influence entrepreneurship is individual, legal and 
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administrative probity
2
, of which corruption is an important (negative) indicator (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 2002; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009).
3
 
Formal institutions are located at the second level down, and here we extend Williamson’s 
(2000) analysis by developing the difference between the constitutional foundations of the formal 
institutional environment and the lower level: detailed regulatory frameworks. Williamson 
emphasises that the key “rules of the game” relate to property rights, and Fogel et al. (2006), 
building on Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), propose that these features of the constitution are 
especially important for entrepreneurs who need to rely on the security of their residual claims for 
the returns from the organisations that they have created (see also Johnson et al., 1999, 2000; Desai 
et al., 2003). Entrepreneurs, especially those, whose growth aspirations are high, must raise capital, 
bear risks and enter new markets. Such activities require “transactional trust” over a long time 
horizon (Fogel et al., 2006), and this is strengthened by property rights that are stable and 
effectively enforced. 
At the second level, regulatory institutions relate to the scale and the day-to-day 
effectiveness of the government apparatus. “Cumbersome regulations and burdensome rules can 
raise the costs of running new business” and government spending can crowd out private 
investment (Fogel et al., 2006), which again matters more for high aspiration projects. More 
generally, while weak property rights generate profound uncertainty in the business environment, 
we would argue that an extensive government is more appropriately seen as generating additional 
cost to entrepreneurs, and this is (relatively) predictable. Williamson (2000) stresses importance of 
property rights, but merges it with the regulatory environment under his second level of the 
institutional order that is formal institutions. For us, the distinction between the constitutional level 
and the regulatory level is important because these affect the growth aspirations of entrepreneurs in 
a different way. 
                                                 
2
 Historically these can be linked to prestige awarded to gentlemanly behaviour and honour (Baumol and Strom, 2007). 
3
 Williamson’s use of the term “embeddedness” differs from the terminology adopted by Granovetter (1985); see our 
discussion below.  
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Williamson’s (2000) third level of institutions is governance, which shapes the way that 
individuals interact, aligning the governance structure they adopt with the types of transactions. He 
places particular emphasis on private governance; for entrepreneurship, this refers to the nexus of 
formal and informal arrangements underlying, for example, the provision of finance and the 
development of supply and distribution networks (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Here we use the 
sociological perspective to extend further Williamson’s framework in the context of 
entrepreneurship. Granovetter (1985) emphasises that types of social relations at the micro level are 
as, if not more, important than the governance structures discussed by Williamson (e.g. 1975; 
1985; 2000).  
The three previous levels of institutions all influence the fourth; resource allocation, 
including occupational choices such as entrepreneurship. We now go on to apply this (augmented) 
Williamson framework to propose specific ways in which these institutions influence the growth 
aspirations of entrepreneurs, addressing each of the levels of the institutional hierarchy in turn. 
 
2.1. Corruption 
Corruption is an informal (i.e. highest order) institution, in which the corresponding customs 
and patterns of behaviour are so widely shared that they become a norm. In a corrupt environment, 
officials realize private benefits at the cost of some business people, institutionalising corruption 
and leading to consistent expectations about it
4
. Corruption can thus be viewed like a tax, 
discouraging economic activities, including high aspiration entrepreneurship, which suffers from 
the higher transactions costs of a more corrupt environment (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). 
Corruption may also be more serious for new firms than incumbents. Firms which survive in a 
corrupt environment will have adapted their behaviour to the corresponding informal norms in 
order to limit the negative effects of corrupt practices (Choi and Thum, 2005; Tonoyan et al., 2010) 
                                                 
4
 Seen this way, corruption is an example of a social element that can become institutionalised without gaining 
legitimacy (Jepperson, 1991). 
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and they will have developed contacts and social networks to mitigate the effects of corruption. 
Insofar as entrepreneurs do not have the relevant business experience, they will need to develop 
these strategies and contacts, and in the interim will operate at a disadvantage.  This notion of 
corruption as an informal social norm providing advantages to incumbent firms can be linked to the 
concept of rent seeking (Desai and Acs, 2007), in which incumbents share private benefits with 
government administrators at the cost of newcomers (Aidis et al., 2008).  
Aidis et al. (2012) present the case that returns to entrepreneurship will be lower when corruption is 
higher, but do not consider how the impact may vary according to the type of entrepreneur.  In fact, 
Murphy et al. (1993) argue that the disincentive effects of corruption will be particularly serious for 
high growth aspiration entrepreneurs; that is, while corruption is detrimental to high value-added 
entrepreneurship, it will not affect subsistence entrepreneurship. They present a formal model 
exploring the trade-off between entrepreneurship and rent seeking (redistributing existing wealth, 
often through corrupt practises) and argue that the latter is rewarded more highly than the former in 
many institutional contexts. More generally, while corruption reduces the returns to all types of 
entrepreneurship, small-scale enterprises and self-employed workers can largely fly below the radar 
screens of corrupt officials, in a manner that would not be possible for new firms with a larger 
economic footprint
5
. Thus, corruption acts not only like a tax, but like a progressive tax, falling 
more heavily on entrepreneurs of sufficient scale to attract the attention of rapacious officials (see 
also Desai and Acs, 2007; Hunt and Laszlo, 2012). High growth entrepreneurs expanding their 
businesses reach a point after which the new firm will start to attract unwelcome attention from 
corrupt bureaucrats, reducing their returns. In the light of this, we hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 1. A higher level of corruption will reduce the growth aspirations of entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                 
5
 A counter-argument is offered by Anokhin and Schulze (2009) who argue that while the presence of corruption will 
affect overall entrepreneurship negatively, high value-added projects will be less affected, as the gains could offset the 
additional costs. Our view is consistent with Aidis and Mickiewicz (2006). 
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2.2. Protection of property rights 
Recent theories of entrepreneurship emphasise that “the institution of private property ... has 
an important psychological dimension that enhances our feelings of ... internal control and personal 
agency, and it thereby promotes entrepreneurial alertness” (Harper 2003: 74). Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) emphasise two related aspects of property rights: vertical, related to the risk of 
expropriation by arbitrary government, and horizontal, related to the quality of contracting 
institutions. The former aspect is more fundamental: effective constraints on the executive branch 
of the government ensure the protection and stability of property rights; in particular, Weingast 
(1995) views the limits imposed on the ability of the government to confiscate wealth as the 
constitutional foundation conducive to entrepreneurship. Property rights from this perspective are 
akin to the related but slightly wider concept of the “rule of law”, in that this corresponds to a 
stable institutional framework restraining the arbitrary use of power by politicians and public 
administrators
6
. This argument parallels our earlier discussion of corruption, but rather than 
increasing direct transactions costs, a lack of secure property rights raises the more fundamental 
threat of expropriation. High growth entrepreneurs, if successful, have potentially more to lose, and 
are also more likely to attract the attention of potential expropriators because of the higher value of 
their assets. Hence insecure property rights are likely to have a greater demotivational effect on 
high growth entrepreneurs.  
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) also leads us to expect that the impact of 
stronger property rights will be greater for new businesses than for established ones. This results 
from two tenets of prospect theory that are consistent with observed behaviour: (i) the point of 
reference is significant in the evaluation of prospects, (ii) different attitudes to risk come into play 
in the evaluation of strategies associated with gains as against losses (risk aversion on the upside 
and risk seeking on the downside). In our analysis, this implies that, arbitrary expropriation comes 
as a loss for established businesses, because they take their already achieved asset position as 
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Note however that an executive constrained by law is different from the absent state. The latter implies no effective 
constraints on predatory behaviour by those with a local monopoly of violence.  
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reference point. However, for new and young businesses, the reference point will instead relate to 
their asset valuation at their starting position (pre-venture launch) and therefore their expectations 
primarily relate to the upside. In this situation, prospect  theory suggests that while established 
business may adopt more risky (and therefore more entrepreneurial) strategies in response to 
threats (potential losses) to property rights, the effect may be just the opposite for new ventures, 
which may opt for safer strategies of limited growth. 
Similar arguments derive from a horizontal contracting perspective,
7
 the cornerstone of which 
is an independent judiciary. Once again here, weak institutions bear more heavily on higher growth 
projects, which have greater needs for capital investment and greater reliance on contractual 
arrangements for the supply of inputs and the distribution of products. For example, entrepreneurs 
that plan to expand rapidly need to think from the outset about feasible sources of finance and 
when property rights are weaker, potential investors are less protected. Providing funds for 
entrepreneurs entails the commitments of financial resources now, in return for promises about the 
future, and there are potentially serious asymmetries of information between lenders and 
borrowers, creating openings for opportunistic behaviour. The risks for the lender are greatly 
mitigated in an environment in which property rights are clearly defined and the legal system is 
transparent and effective. Moreover entrepreneurs must enter contracts with suppliers and retailers 
who, with asymmetries of information and perhaps greater experience compared to a newcomer, 
can have opportunities to cheat. Such issues are less significant for the self-employed and micro-
firms, who are more likely to try to satisfy their financing requirements themselves or via family 
and friends, and who can rely to a greater extent on informal relationship with suppliers and 
distributors (Fogel et al., 2006). Yet, the horizontal and the vertical aspects of property rights are 
related; an independent judiciary that underpins the horizontal (contract-related) security is harder 
                                                 
7
Associated with the level of governance in Williamson’s hierarchy of institutions. 
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to achieve with an arbitrary government (vertical dimension), because political interventions into 
the judicial process make the outcomes of the latter uncertain.
8
 
 Thus, our next hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Insecure property rights (arbitrary government) will reduce the growth aspirations of 
entrepreneurs. 
 
2.3. Regulatory frameworks and government activity 
Williamson highlights the role of regulatory frameworks in shaping incentives. In the context 
of entrepreneurship, we would argue, following Fogel et al. (2006) that the key corresponding 
dimension is the level of activity of the government. As the state sector grows, a bureaucratic 
apparatus replaces areas of private decision-making. But the government then faces an acute 
agency problem because most of its output is not produced according to market driven processes, 
so determining the value of output and evaluating efficiency becomes a challenge (Boettke and 
Coyne, 2009). This is alleviated by bureaucratisation, an extensive network of regulations, but 
these in turn lead to ‘bureaucratic costs’ (Williamson, 1985). The increased complexity affects not 
just the internal organisation of the government but also those who have to deal with them, 
including businesses. “Pressures to conform to procedural requirements” imply “larger and more 
complex” administrative structures of business organisations (Scott and Meyer, 1991:123). 
Newcomers have to learn the corresponding rules and regulations and this especially slows down 
                                                 
8
 The use of this conceptual framework leads us to de-emphasise a category of institution often stressed in the 
literature, intellectual property rights (IPR) ( Autio and Acs,2010; Bowen and De Clercq,2008).  If entrepreneurs are 
exploiting innovations, they are argued to be exposed to theft of their ideas, which would be protected by stronger IPR. 
However, Minniti and Lévesque (2010) question the centrality of innovation to entrepreneurial processes in all 
institutional contexts. Baumol and Strom (2007) suggest that the protection of IPR has become too rigid, strangling 
entrepreneurship instead of promoting it. Indeed, Lerner (2009) finds that strong IPR are negatively associated with 
innovation. Thus while we regard property rights as critical for high growth entrepreneurs, we propose that strong IPR 
will probably not have a similar impact across a variety of institutional environments including both developed and 
emerging economies. 
12 
 
the dynamism of new ventures. In particular, high growth entrepreneurs will be aware that if their 
firms do achieve larger scale, they will be involved in greater bureaucratic costs.
9
  
Fogel et al. (2006) place administrative quality and government actions at the institutional 
level below property rights and the legal regime. Moreover, they identify the size of the 
government (measured by expenditures) as a concise measure of ‘government activism’; an 
approach also applied by Aidis et al. (2012). Both argue that entrepreneurship will be negatively 
associated with the extent of government activity because of various forms of crowding out. As the 
government becomes more active, it needs to absorb a greater proportion of the resources of the 
economy and must compete for inputs with the private sector. It therefore bids up the supply prices 
for key resources needed by entrepreneurs, notably finance and human capital, and these higher 
costs may be felt more keenly by entrepreneurs than by existing firms because the former lack 
networks, contacts and experience.  
Greater government activism also requires higher state revenues, and is associated with more 
extensive welfare system. These are likely significantly to influence both the opportunity cost and 
the net financial return to high growth entrepreneurship, affecting it relatively more seriously than 
entrepreneurship as a whole. The higher cost of capital resulting from financial crowding out will 
particularly affect high growth entrepreneurs, because, as discussed above, they will have greater 
need of investment, and will be more likely to rely on formal capital markets rather than informal 
loans through their personal networks. Their expected surpluses are greater, and so they are more 
likely to be demotivated by higher taxes, especially if these are progressive. Higher marginal rates 
of taxes will also weaken the incentives for growth aspiration entrepreneurship by reducing the 
expected gains
10
 and more generally taxation may benefit larger incumbent firms at the cost of 
aspiring newcomers, especially if the former can increase their debt ratio more easily thereby 
                                                 
9
Autio (2011) calculates long-term average prevalence rates of high growth-aspiration entrepreneurs. He comments on 
the fact that these are several times higher in China than in India and links it to the extent of regulation in the latter. In 
the European context, Spain and Greece have exceptionally low rates. Both economies have been characterised by a 
large scope of government intervention. 
10
Though different types of taxes have different, ambiguous and nonlinear effects (Bruce and Mohsin, 2006; Georgellis 
and Wall, 2006; Cullen and Gordon, 2007). 
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escaping corporate taxes (Henrekson, 2007). At the same time, higher levels of welfare support 
provide alternative sources of income and, by increasing the alternative wage, may therefore reduce 
the net expected return. Higher growth entrepreneurship may be particularly negatively affected 
because the reservation wages of new employees will also be increased. Equally, if not more 
important, extensive welfare support undermines the incentives for individual saving, which is a 
strong factor in entrepreneurial finance (Henrekson, 2007; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011). 
Again, the availability of savings is most critical for high growth entrepreneurship
11
. And last but 
not least, “countries with generous social security and welfare schemes do not emphasize the 
responsibility of the individual for their own survival, which may hamper ambitions to strive for 
innovation and growth.” (Hessels et al., 2008: 328). 
Accordingly we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 3. A greater scale of government activity will reduce the growth aspirations of 
entrepreneurs. 
 
To summarize, while we argue that insecure property rights (H2) affect entrepreneurial 
ambitions via increased risk and uncertainty, in contrast, both government activism (H3) and 
embedded corruption (H1) may be better seen as cost elements which also have progressive 
aspects, therefore affecting growth aspirations negatively as well. 
 
                                                 
11
A counter-argument is that the additional insurance offered by welfare may actually enhance propensity to engage in 
risky ventures. However, Henrekson et al. (2010) question its empirical validity. 
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2.4. Micro level social structures and national level institutions 
The characteristics and quality of social relations at a micro level are also important for 
entrepreneurial choices; failing to take these into account corresponds to what Granovetter (1985) 
describes as an ‘undersocialized approach’. Micro-social structures are potentially significant 
determinants of entrepreneurship, and business networks in particular have been found to be 
important, both in assisting entrepreneurs to find the resources required for business creation 
(Aldrich et al., 1987; Aidis et al., 2008), and via social learning (Minniti et al., 2005). Network 
capital also facilitates entrepreneurs’ access to finance (Aldrich et al., 1987; Johannisson, 2000; 
Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011). 
In addition to stimulating entrepreneurial activities directly, local social structures may also 
compensate for deficiencies in the institutional environment. We already hinted at this above while 
discussing H1-H3, highlighting that young businesses may be more affected by institutional 
deficiencies because unlike established businesses they cannot offset the problems with support 
from business-relevant social networks that established businesses may have had time to build. At 
the same time, new business owners-managers may differ in their access to social networks, which   
provides us with a way to explore this connection more directly.  
Accordingly we posit that support from local social networks may be especially important 
for individuals and entrepreneurial teams starting new growth-orientated ventures in weak 
institutional contexts. In particular, business contact with other entrepreneurs may provide new 
entrepreneurs with advice, support and access to resources that result in the building of social 
capital which can support the growth of their young businesses. These factors are especially 
important in weaker institutional contexts; learning from experienced entrepreneurs how to cope 
with corrupt or otherwise dysfunctional environment may help aspiring ones to acquire the skills, 
relationships and confidence needed for expansion of their businesses. This perspective is similar 
to that of the  ‘institutional void”  literature (Khanna and Palepu, 2010), which argues that 
15 
 
institutional deficiencies such as those discussed above may  lead to higher transaction costs and in 
turn may be partly compensated with business networks. 
Consistent with this, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 4. Social contacts with other entrepreneurs will (i) support an individual’s growth 
aspirations, and (ii) attenuate the negative impact on growth aspirations of deficiencies in the 
national institutions discussed in hypotheses 1-3.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Individual Data 
We construct the dataset to test our hypotheses by merging data from the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) (see Reynolds et al., 2005) with a variety of time-varying national institutional 
indicators and macroeconomic controls. We utilize data collected through the GEM adult 
population surveys in 2001-2006 that cover 42 countries worldwide (for details of the sampling 
procedure, see Reynolds et al., 2008)
12
. In this study, we use young firms (created in the past 42 
months) as our proxy for entrepreneurial entry. This category serves well the purpose of our study 
because growth aspirations refer to firms already in existence. Also unlike an alternative measure, 
nascent entrepreneurship, the young firm category provides good coverage of the current level of 
employment used in defining our dependent variable. Owners-managers of nascent ventures find it 
difficult to respond to questions concerning the current level of employment; in our dataset, only 
8% of the nascent but 83% of young firms actually report the level of employment.
 
                                                 
12
The GEM data capture a wide range of business creation activities, distinguishing between (a) individuals who intend 
to create a new venture, (b) who are in the process of establishing a new firm (start-ups, or nascent entrepreneurs), (c) 
currently operating young firms (under 3.5 years), and (d) other owners-managers of established businesses. 
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3.2. Dependent variable 
We use employment growth aspirations (EGA) of entrepreneurs as our dependent variable 
capturing the intentions of newly established entrepreneurs to increase employment over a five year 
horizon.  The use of aspirations to indicate outcomes has a sound theoretical and empirical base 
derived from the central role attributed to ‘strategic dynamism’ in the analytical construct of 
‘entrepreneurial orientation’. This has robust empirical validity in terms of predicting performance 
(Covin and Wales, 2011). Moreover, there is empirical evidence that entrepreneurial aspirations are 
closely related to entrepreneurial outcomes. Thus, Kolvereid and Bullvag (1996), Baum et al. 
(1998), Baum et al. (2001), Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) and Delmar and Wiklund (2008) find a 
positive significant link between entrepreneurs' growth aspirations and actual growth
13
. We 
calculate the entrepreneur’s employment growth aspirations as the difference between the natural 
logarithms of expected level (five years hence) and the current level of employment, which 
approximates the expected rate of employment growth
14
. Previous studies utilizing GEM data 
(Bowen and DeClercq, 2008; Autio and Acs, 2010) use instead the level of employment
15
. We do 
not consider this to be an appropriate measure because the employment growth rate may become 
zero or even negative when we take account of the current level of employment, even in a business 
classified as having high growth aspirations. Of the entrepreneurs who expect to employ others five 
years hence, 28.5% have their expected employment equal to their current level of employment; 
hence their actual expectation is of zero employment growth
16
. 
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 Psychologists have studied the same issue; a meta-analysis finds that aspirations have a significant impact in 
explaining outcomes, though this is not the only explanation (Sheeran, 2002). 
14
Following existing practice (Parker, 2009), we add the owner-manager to the expected and current employees to 
calculate employment. 
15The question is worded, ‘How many people will be working for this business, not counting the owners but including 
all exclusive subcontractors, when it is five years old?’, which does not capture the expected net employment creation 
compared with the current level. 
16
There are also some cases when the expected rate of employment growth is actually negative (4.5%). 
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Figure 1 illustrates the differences between countries in the employment growth aspirations of 
new businesses, with 95% confidence intervals
17
. We observe considerable heterogeneity across 
countries. Thus, the national average aspired rate of employment growth over five years is as low 
as 16% in Greece and as high as 74% in Chile.  The average across all countries in our sample is 
41%, which is the horizontal line at zero in the figure.  
{Figure 1} 
Figure 2 plots young businesses’ prevalence rates against growth aspirations across countries. 
Thus on the horizontal axis we have average prevalence rates of young businesses and growth 
aspirations on the vertical. The figure supports the starting point for this paper; that even at the 
national level, entrepreneurship and high growth aspiration entrepreneurship do not match closely. 
Thus Chile has middle-range prevalence rate of entrepreneurship, but entrepreneurs’ growth 
aspirations are high. In contrast, similar middle-range prevalence rate in Jordan comes with low 
average aspirations. Greece, with a prevalence rate similar to other relatively developed economies, 
has remarkably few high-growth-aspiration entrepreneurs. 
{Figure 2} 
 
3.3. Cross country and micro data related to our hypotheses 
While other studies  used World Bank data to explore some related hypotheses (e.g. Desai et al., 
2003; Djankov et al., 2002), we favour the Heritage Foundation dataset because it covers more 
years, and therefore matches more closely the variation by country and time in our GEM sample 
(see McMullen et al., 2008; Aidis et al., 2012). Therefore, to test Hypothesis 1, we use the Heritage 
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These were calculated from a random-intercept model that included only country effects. These mean scores for 
countries are calculated on the basis of random intercepts, while confidence intervals are based on empirical Bayesian 
predictions. 
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Foundation Index of ‘Freedom from Corruption’18 (l.Corr, where the operator l is added to denote 
that a variable is lagged). This indicator shows the perception of corruption in the business 
environment, including levels of governmental administrative, judicial and legal corruption (Beach 
and Kane, 2008). It ranges from 0 to 100; after our transformation, 100 indicates the highest level 
of corruption
19
. For the strength of property rights (Hypothesis 2), we follow Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) and use the Polity IV measure of efficient constraints on the arbitrary power of the 
executive branch of the government (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007), “constraints on executive” 
(l.ExecConstr). In a supplementary test, we also investigate the significance of IPR, using its 
measure from the World Economic Forum. It is scored as a continuous variable from 1, denoting 
weak protection, to 7, representing the world’s most stringent level of protection (l.IntelPro). We 
also use the Heritage Foundation to measure the size of the government in Hypothesis 3. This 
measure is a quadratic transformation of the ratio of government expense to GDP (l.GovSize)
20
. 
In order to test hypothesis 4, we mediate the institutional factors with a variable capturing social 
networking. We measure this by using the response to a GEM question about whether the 
individual knows an entrepreneur involved in any start-up personally (KnowsEntrep), interacted 
separately with each of the institutional factors: corruption, constraints on executive and 
government size. 
3.4 Control Variables 
Our estimation method is multilevel modelling and we have control variables at both the 
country and individual levels. Thus, we include the national level of development with per capita 
(pc) GDP at purchasing power parity (l.GDPpc) and the GDP annual growth rate (obtained from 
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 Transformed by subtracting it from 100 to reverse the scale. 
19
 Separating different components of corruption would produce sharper tests, but we are not aware of data with 
sufficient coverage to correspond to our GEM sample by country and year. 
20
 To make the interpretation easier, we follow Reynolds (2010) in transforming the Heritage Foundation measure to 
obtain the original ratio of government expense to GDP, so that larger values reflect a larger size of government. This 
is done by reversing the formula used by Heritage Foundation which is:  
Heritage measure of Government size = 100 – 0.03(Government expense to GDP)/2 (Beach 2008: 46).  
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the World Bank) for cyclical effects (l.GDPgrowth) (see Aidis et al., 2012), as well as  some key  
individual characteristics of entrepreneurs (Parker, 2009). Thus, previous GEM-based research 
shows that individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely to direct their efforts 
towards high-growth activities (Autio, 2005) so we control for tertiary education (EducPost). In 
addition, age has been considered as a factor affecting entrepreneurial growth aspirations in the 
past (Kolvereid, 1992), so we control for age (Age).
21
 Being a male may affect growth aspirations 
(Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011) so we include a dummy variable for gender (Male). We also control 
for the current level of employment, expecting a higher initial level of employment to be negatively 
related to employment growth plans (CurrEmp) and introduce a dummy variable denoting 
individual experience of being a business angel (BusAngel). Previous entrepreneurial experience 
enhances self-efficacy, both through “direct mastery experience (learning by doing) and vicarious 
experience (learning by seeing)” (Harper 2003: 46), and may therefore affect growth aspirations. 
However, owning another existing business (EstabBus) may raise the opportunity cost of a new 
involvement at a larger scale. 
Finally, we introduced a set of sectoral (industry) controls in all our specifications to take 
account of sectoral differences in capital-intensity and optimum size of the firm that may affect 
growth aspirations.  
The definitions of all variables are presented in Table 1 below. 
{Table 1} 
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We tested for non-linearity in age but the results were insignificant. 
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3.5 Methodology 
We use multilevel modelling to address unobserved heterogeneity within the context of a cross-
country, cross-time, cross-individual dataset. Multilevel modelling takes account of the fact that the 
dataset has a hierarchical structure in which individuals represent level one, country-years samples 
represent level two and countries represent level three. This allows us to control for clustering of 
the data first within a country and second within a country-year subsample. Failure to do this would 
lead to biased results (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005).  We utilise more sample information by 
choosing country and country-years for our level two and three groupings correspondingly, to take 
account of differences in samples collected in different years. We tested whether the choice of 
multilevel modelling with country and country-year effects was justified and accepted its use: we 
found that both country and country-year group effects (random intercepts) were statistically 
significant.  
In addition to individual effects (subscript ijk below, where i represents an individual, j a 
particular annual-country sample, and k a country) we also introduced country averages (subscript 
k below), distinguishing between individual level and group level variation, so that for instance 
coefficient β5 for EstabBusijk represents an individual effect of being an owner of established 
business, and coefficient β12for EstabBusk represents a peer effect of  the prevalence rate of 
established firms in a given country group that may affect entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations. By 
using the LR test, we verified whether the inclusion of peer effects was justified. 
Our baseline regression model is therefore specified as follows: 
ijkjkkjkjkjkjk
jkjkkkk
kkkkijkijk
ijkijkijkijkijkijk
vuGDPpclGDPgrowthlIntelprolCorrl
ExecConstrlGovSizelpKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBus
EducPostMaleAgeCurrEmppKnowsEntreBusAngel
EstabBusEducPostMaleAgeCurrEmpEGA








....
..
20191817
1615141312
11109876
543210
 (1) 
where EGAijk is our measure of entrepreneurial growth aspirations,  
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 },,,,,, ijkijkijkijkijkijkijk pKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBusEducPostMaleAgeCurrEmp  
represent individual-level direct effects, 
 ,,,,,,, kkkkkkk pKnowsEntreBusAngelEstabBusEducPostMaleAgeCurrEmp  
represent country mean effects,  and  
jkjkjkjkjkjk GDPpclGDPgrowthlCorrlIntelprolExecConstrlGovSizel .,.,.,.,.,.  
represent the lagged values of the institutional variables and macroeconomic controls
22
.  
The combination of uk+vjk+εijk represents the random part of the equation, where uk are the 
country level residuals, vjk are the year-country residuals, and εijk are individual-level residuals.  
 
Our study may be subject to some potential endogeneity because the country-year individual 
growth aspirations when aggregated are likely to affect some of the macro variables, for instance 
GDP growth rate. We alleviate this issue by lagging the macroeconomic and institutional variables; 
the institutional variables by three years, which was the longest available without reducing the 
sample, and the macroeconomic indicators by one year.
23
 To investigate potential multicollinearity 
problems, we calculated variance inflation factors (VIF) for all our variables
24
. Apart from the 
interaction term between one of the institutional variables (executive constraints) and KnowsEntrep 
(knowing other entrepreneurs), and its composites, we found no indication of multicollinearity 
problems. Thus the VIF for all other variables are well below the conventional level of 10. 
Moreover, for our sample, the impact of multicollinearity is to some extent counterbalanced by the 
large sample size, i.e. we do not face the “micronumerocity” problem (Goldberger, 1991) which 
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We also encountered the same problems with outliers in the employment growth expectations variable as Autio and 
Acs (2010) and resolved them in the similar way.  We eliminated 171 individual-level observations based on the 
definition of severe outliers as being outside the outer fence (defined by inter-quartile range multiplied by three). We 
checked the sensitivity of our results to eliminating outliers and found that some of our results do not hold in the 
presence of outliers but our approach is justified by the fact that expectations become very imprecise for largest 
numbers and are outside a plausible range. 
23
 We were able to construct three years lags for all our institutional variables but intellectual property rights, for which 
we use a two year lag. 
24
Based on specification 7 in Table 3. 
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can be another source of instability in coefficients. Despite this, we still choose to apply a 
conservative strategy of focusing on simple correlations to guide our approach to specification in 
the face of multicollinearity. We take a cut-off point of over 0.7 (for correlation matrix, see Table 
2), to determine the specifications and robustness checks we report below, as we discuss in the next 
section
25
. 
 {Table 2} 
4. Empirical results 
Our empirical results are presented in Table 3. We report a variety of specifications to indicate 
the robustness of our findings. First, we report the model without country means as specification 
(1), and then add country-aggregates of individual-level variables (peer effects) as specification 2. 
The latter corresponds to our baseline regression as discussed in the previous section. We next 
perform the likelihood ratio (LR) test to check whether the inclusion of the peer effects improves 
the goodness of fit. The LR ratio test statistic (see a note to Table 3) informs us that adding all the 
peer effects does not improve the fit, so we thereafter retain only the one which is statistically 
significant: the country-averaged owners of established business in specification 3. The LR test 
now indicates an improvement in the model goodness of fit over the baseline specification.  
Specification 4 addresses a multicollinearity issue, in that we observe in Table 2 that corruption is 
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We also considered the bias caused by potential interdependence between the choice of whether to become an 
entrepreneur and growth aspirations, by  introducing into the employment growth aspirations equation (second stage or 
outcome equation) the inverse Mill’s ratio based on modelling the choice to become an  entrepreneur (first stage or 
selection equation). To identify the first stage of the Heckman selection model, we chose a variable that is correlated 
with the first stage dependent variable (entrepreneurial entry) and uncorrelated with the second one (growth 
aspirations). We utilised two alternative identification strategies to ensure robustness. In the first, we use a series on 
start-up entry regulation procedures from the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators. Theory suggests that 
entrepreneurial entry will be closely related to start-up entry regulation procedures (see e.g. Djankov et al., 2002) but 
because they constitute sunk costs, they should not be relevant for employment growth aspirations of new firms.  Our 
alternative identification strategy focuses on informal finance. This is a major influence on entrepreneurial entry 
(Bygrave, 2003) but is likely to play a less important role in growth aspirations, as for those formal sources of funds 
will be needed. We therefore introduce the prevalence rate of informal investors into the selection equation. These are 
derived from GEM data by taking the average percentage of respondents who invested in another start-up in the past 
three years in each country-year sub-sample.  However neither of these was statistically significant. Thus, we could not 
detect a selection bias arising from the possibility that the factors determining the decision to become an entrepreneur 
might differ from those determining a new firm’s employment growth expectations. Accordingly, we focus further only 
on the employment growth aspiration models. 
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highly correlated with GDP per capita (-0.85); well above our cut-off point of 0.7. We therefore run 
specification 4 using an alternative control for the level of development; a set of GDP pc dummies 
denoting the five quintiles of its distribution. Finally, we explore whether the general measure of 
protection of property rights substitutes for IPR as used by Autio and Acs (2010) and Bowen and 
De Clercq (2008), creating an omitted variable problem. To verify this, we run specification (5), 
where the constitutional level measure of property rights (effective constraints on the executive) is 
substituted with IPR. Due to the high correlation between IPR and corruption (-0.83), we also omit 
corruption, otherwise it could work against getting a significant result for IPR. Specifications 6-8 
report the interaction term results, testing Hypothesis 4: in these three specifications we augment 
our model with the cross-level interaction terms between knowing other entrepreneurs and 
government size, corruption and constraints on the executive correspondingly. Each model reports 
log-likelihood and Akaike Information Criterion to indicate the goodness of fit (Grilli and 
Rampichini, 2011).   
Considering our results, we find the coefficient on corruption to be highly significant and with 
the expected sign in all specifications where it is included, supporting Hypothesis 1 that 
entrepreneurs in institutional environments which are more corrupt have lower employment growth 
aspirations.  We also find evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. The variable that we use to measure 
the strength of property rights, constraints on executive, is significant and positive in all 
specifications but (1) and (2). In contrast, the coefficient on IPR is insignificant in specification (5). 
Thus, as expected, we do not identify a significant impact of the strength of IPR on entrepreneurs’ 
employment growth aspirations. We further find strong support for hypothesis 3 in all five 
specifications; the coefficient on the size of the government is always negative and highly 
significant. 
{Table 3} 
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4.1. Interaction Effects 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that social effects at individual level may moderate the impact of the 
institutional context.  We therefore ran a series of models in which we interacted our three 
institutional measures with the social network variable (knowing other entrepreneurs). These are 
reported in Table 3 (specifications 6-8). We find support for Hypothesis 4. Hence, for interactions 
with constraints on executive and corruption measures, embeddedness in local social networks 
decreases the significance of these macro effects (Table 3, specification (6)). To make the 
evaluation of the interactions easier, where we found significant effects, we also plot as Figures 3 
and 4 respectively the corresponding predictive margins separately for those respondents who have 
business contact (as captured by “knowing other entrepreneurs”) and those who have not for a 
range of values of respective institutions. On both graphs the line corresponding to respondents 
without these social contacts is steeper, implying their aspirations are more strongly affected by the 
institutional quality, consistent with H4. 
{Figures 3 and 4} 
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4.2. Control variables 
Turning to the control variables, the patterns largely conform to expectations and findings 
elsewhere in the literature. The individual age effects are significant and negative: older people 
have lower employment growth aspirations. Higher or postsecondary education and being a male is 
positively associated with growth aspirations, as is previous experience as a business angel. Being 
the owner of an existing business has no significant effect. In contrast, the impact of network 
capital (knowing other entrepreneurs) is highly significant and positive across all specifications. 
The current level of employment, although with the expected negative sign, is insignificant. Per 
capita GDP is negatively related to growth aspirations and when this variable is replaced with a set 
of quintile dummies, countries which fall within the three highest 20
th
 percentiles of GDP per 
capita are found to have lower growth aspirations. These results are consistent with the view that 
there is a wider set of high growth opportunities for entrepreneurs in developing economies. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
We have explored how heterogeneity in institutions across countries might affect 
entrepreneurs’ employment growth aspirations. We drew on the ideas of North (1990), Williamson 
(2000) and Granovetter (1985) to formulate our conceptualisation of the institutions relevant to 
high growth entrepreneurship. We also built on the empirical developments of Bowen and De 
Clercq (2008) and Autio and Acs (2010). Using a large inter temporal cross-country  cross-
individual dataset and multilevel modelling methods, we found support for all our hypotheses 
concerning the effects of corruption, property rights, government activity, and the cross-level 
mediating effects of individual social networks and these institutions on the growth aspirations of 
entrepreneurs.    
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Our finding on property rights is directly consistent with Williamson (2000), who emphasises 
these as being at the core of the formal institutional order. While he does not stress corruption, 
following North (1990) he also attaches significance to informal institutions and we have proposed 
that corruption represents an embedded pattern of informal behaviour norms that becomes 
institutionalised as part of a slow changing informal order. We go beyond Williamson’s (2000) 
framework in emphasising the difference between the constitutional level formal institutions 
(constraints on executive branch of the government) and the lower level formal setup, more related 
to medium and short-term policy choices, and best captured by government activism. Aspirations 
of entrepreneurs may be affected by both, but the mechanisms are different. We argue that 
institutional deficiencies at the constitutional level create profound unpredictability in the 
environment that the entrepreneurs face. On the other hand, a more active government, though it 
can also make the environment relatively less stable due to policy changes, is best seen as imposing 
additional, but predictable costs on businesses, which the entrepreneurs must take into account in 
shaping their aspirations.  
Our results robustly indicate that both weak property rights and corruption do independently 
constrain entrepreneur’s employment growth aspirations. We also find strong support for the idea 
that high growth entrepreneurship will be crowded out by government activism. Thus the key 
institutions for entrepreneurs are several, and related in a complex way; the notion of “weak” or 
strong “institutions is insufficiently fine grained. A large, active government may play many 
important roles in society, but there is a cost in terms of entrepreneurial employment aspirations.  
Importantly, lack of security of property rights and government size are not highly correlated 
empirically (see Table 2); consistent with Aidis et al. (2012), we have found support for the idea 
developed in our conceptual framework that they cannot be compressed into a single institutional 
dimension. For example, the growth aspirations of owners-managers of young businesses may be 
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low both in Russia and Germany, but that may be caused more by the arbitrariness of the 
government in the former case, and more by its size in the latter
26
. 
While we adopt Williamson’s hierarchy of institutions, we argue that it is an analytical tool 
which should be handled carefully. In particular, Granovetter’s (1985) critique of the new 
institutional economics should be taken seriously. He argues that, at the lower level of institutional 
structure, not only the formal governance structures but also local social structures and social 
networks are important. Our results are consistent with this view: the impact of macro level 
institutions, notably corruption and property rights, is weaker where local social ties are stronger.
27
 
This is also in line with much of the sociological literature on new institutionalism, which suggests 
that the impact of macro level institutional order is moderated by local social structures (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
There are some important limitations to our study which one might wish to address in 
subsequent research. While GEM provides the largest cross-country dataset available on 
entrepreneurial activity, the number of countries and especially developing countries is restricted. 
Thus, the variation in institutions is somewhat limited. Moreover, the time horizon of the dataset is 
still quite short; certainly not long enough for testing the impact of institutional development on 
entrepreneurial aspirations within any one country. Hence, our hypotheses relate primarily to the 
impact of cross-sectional variation in institutions. This limitation can  be addressed in the future by 
undertaking a similar analysis to that presented in this paper when the number of countries and 
years has expanded, especially once GEM includes more low and middle income countries. Last 
but not least, while we took some steps to alleviate endogeneity, we cannot claim to eliminate it. 
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 It may seem surprising that we are unable to confirm the impact of strong IPR on growth aspirations. However, our 
results are consistent with both Minniti and Lévesque (2010), who point out that the role of Schumpeterian innovation-
oriented entrepreneurship may be overemphasised, and with Baumol and Strom (2007) who stress the counter-
productive effects if the protection of IPR becomes too strong. 
27
 However, in the case of government size, we did not find a significant moderating effect of networks. This may be 
simply due to the fact that we do not measure network characteristics that would be relevant here. It could be, for 
instance, that ‘knowing government officials’ could prove significant, but we do not have such a survey instrument at 
our disposal.  
28 
 
Availability of panel data or further exploration of possible instruments would be important to 
overcome the problem. 
Our findings have important implications for policy makers. Institutions are multi-faceted, 
and higher level institutions are slower to change than lower level ones. Our results suggest that 
policy makers concerned to increase growth and employment creation through entrepreneurship 
first try to understand more carefully which aspects of the institutional environment is deficient, 
and then work systematically to improve them, focusing consistently on the long term as well as 
short term changes. Moreover, it is inappropriate to rely on social networks to substitute for real 
institutional reform. We have shown that entrepreneurs adopt high growth aspirations in some 
contexts because macro institutions such as property rights have been substituted by a greater or 
lesser extent by (micro) local informal ones like social networks. However, while this effect 
reduces the negative impact of deficient higher order institutions, it does not eliminate it, as 
documented by our Table 3 results, illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. The higher order institutions 
remain important for growth aspiration entrepreneurship, even when we account for moderating 
impact of local social structures: growth aspirations are significantly reduced where corruption is 
high, property rights protection is inadequate, or government size is large. These three indicate the 
directions for any policy reform aiming to enhance growth aspirations of owners-managers of 
young businesses.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory and variables.  
   
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Explanatory variables: business environment & macroeconomic variables 
Constraints on executive  
(t-3) 
Polity IV ‘Executive Constraints’; scores from 1=”unlimited 
authority” to 7=”executive parity”; higher value denotes less 
arbitrariness 
6.57 1.06 
Intellectual property 
rights (t-2) 
Intellectual Property Protection index (Global Competitiveness 
Report); scores from 1=”weak protection” to 7=”strong 
protection” 
5.25 1.06 
Corruption (t-3) Heritage Foundation ‘Corruption’ index, ranging from 0 to 100; 
higher value denotes more corruption 
29.33 21.56 
Government size (t-3) Government spending / GDP; calculated from Heritage 
Foundation ‘Government size’ index (HF), reversing their 
formula: Government Size = [(100 – HF) / 0.03]0.03 
38.27 11.7 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1) GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, constant at 2000 
$USD (WB WDI 2010) 
25,244 11,191 
GDP growth rate (t-1) Annual GDP growth rate (WB WDI 2010) 3.15 2.67 
iq2 The second quintile of the logarithm of GDP pc at PPP (t-1) .21 .41 
iq3 The third quintile of the logarithm of GDP pc at PPP (t-1) .18 .39 
iq4 The fourth quintile of the logarithm of GDP pc at PPP (t-1) .17 .37 
iq5 The fifth quintile of the logarithm of GDP pc at PPP (t-1) .20 .40 
Explanatory variables: personal characteristics 
Age The exact age of the respondent between 14 and 99 at time of 
interview 
39 12 
Male 1=male, 0 otherwise .63 .48 
Current employment Current number of employees + owner-manager  97 5688 
Education: Post-
secondary 
1=respondent has a post-secondary education .18 .38 
Owner-manager of 
existing business 
1=current owner/manager of business, 0 otherwise .04 .19 
Bus angel in last 3 years 1=business angel in past three years, 0 otherwise .08 .28 
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
1=personally knows entrepreneurs in past two years, zero 
otherwise 
.62 .48 
Dependent variable: 
Entrepreneur’s 
employment growth 
aspirations  (EGA) 
Percentage change in the expected level of employment in 5- yrs’ 
time over the current level of employment by new firms  
.42 .67 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006 unless specified otherwise; the reported statistics are based on the set of observations actually used 
in estimations (8,160) to eliminate the joint effect of missingess in all variables.  
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Table 2 
Correlation matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Entrepreneur’s 
Growth 
Aspirations (1) 
1             
      
Current 
employment 
level  (2) 
-.02 1            
      
Age (3) -.11 -.01 1           
      
Male (4) .08 .00 -.00 1          
      
Education: 
postsecondary 
(5) 
.03 -.00 .05 .01 1         
      
Owner-manager 
of exist. bus (6) 
-.03 -.00 .05 .02 .06 1        
      
Bus angel in last 
3 years (7) 
.05 -.00 -.01 .04 .06 .08 1       
      
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
(8) 
.11 .01 -.12 .11 .06 .00 .10 1      
      
Owner-manager 
of exist. bus, 
country mean(9) 
-.01 .00 -.08 -.07 -.04 .01 .02 -.02 1     
      
Government 
size, HF (t-3) 
(10) 
-.08 .01 .06 .05 .04 .01 -.00 .06 -.51 1    
      
Constraints on 
executive (t-3) 
(11) 
-.03 .00 .08 -.03 .01 .02 -.01 -.02 -.17 .55 1   
      
Intellectual 
property rights 
(t-2) (12) 
-.02 .01 .13 .04 .06 -.05 -.00 .03 -.57 .56 .36 1  
      
Corruption (t-3) 
(13) 
.02 -.01 -.14 -.03 -.12 .00 -.01 -.05 .56 -.61 -.35 -.83 1 
      
GDP growth 
rate (t-1) (14) 
.03 -.02 -.03 -.04 .02 .00 .00 .02 .28 -.40 -.39 -.40 .28 1      
GDP per capita 
ppp (t-1) (15) 
-.04 .01 .14 .05 .11 .05 .02 .03 -.59 .52 .34 .80 -85 .24 1     
iq2 (16) -.04 .01 .03 .01 -.05 .18 .00 -.05 .11 .05 .14 -.21 .09 .10 -.05 1    
iq3 (17) -.01 -.01 .04 .04 -.05 -.07 -.04 .04 -.32 .42 .18 .34 -.35 -.22 .21 -.24 1   
iq4 (18) -.01 -.01 .04 -.01 .13 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.26 .23 .18 .41 -.31 -.13 .26 -.23  1  
iq5 (19) .00 .03 .05 .02 .04 -.03 .06 .04 -.12 -.05 -.08 .30 -.32 -.03 .55 -.26 -.24 -.23 1 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006; Polity IV, Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), 
HeritageFoundation, UNCTAD, World Bank WDI. All variablesexcept for dummy variables are 
standardised. The correlation matrix is produced based on the set of observations actually used in 
estimations (8,160).
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Table 3 
Estimation results for entrepreneur’s growth aspirations, Multilevel Random Intercept model. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Individual level variables 
Current employment level  -0.0107 -0.0104 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0106 -0.0104 -0.0104 -0.0104 
 (0.0072) (0.00718) (0.00718) (0.00718) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.00718) (0.0072) 
Age -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.114*** -0.11*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) 
Male 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.112*** 0.11*** 0.114*** 0.11*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Education: postsecondary 0.0541** 0.0548** 0.0542** 0.0527** 0.0569** 0.052** 0.0517** 0.053** 
 (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) 
Owner-manager of exist  -0.0602 -0.0590 -0.0604 -0.0609 -0.0578 -0.0609 -0.0607 -0.0617 
businesses (0.0524) (0.0523) (0.0523) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0524) (0.0523) (0.0524) 
Bus angel in last 3 years 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.13*** 0.130*** 0.13*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) (0.0333) 
Knows other entrepreneurs 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.139**
* 
0.142*** 0.14*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.02) (0.0195) (0.02) 
Country level means 
Current employment level  - -0.00636 - - - - - - 
country mean - (0.0129) - - - - - - 
Male, country mean - -0.0156 - - - - - - 
 - (0.0230) - - - - - - 
Education: postsecondary,  - -0.0144 - - - - - - 
country mean - (0.0225) - - - - - - 
Owner-manager of exist  - -0.0481** -0.051*** -0.0417** -0.0340 -0.041** -0.0401** -0.044** 
bus, country mean - (0.0241) (0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0216) (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0193) 
Bus angel in last 3 years,  - -0.0279 - - - - - - 
country mean - (0.0271) - - - - - - 
Knows other entrepreneurs,  - 0.0520 - - - - - - 
country mean - (0.0326) - - - - - - 
Variables related to hypotheses 1-3 
Government size, HF index  -0.100*** -0.130*** -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.120*** -0.12*** 
reversed (t-3) (0.0224) (0.0234) (0.0216) (0.0235) (0.0241) (0.0264) (0.0234) (0.0237) 
Constraints on executive 0.0288 0.0303 0.0381** 0.0343* - 0.0344* 0.0362* 0.06*** 
(t-3) (0.0199) (0.0213) (0.0181) (0.0189) - (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0225) 
Intellectual property rights  - - - - 0.0171 - - - 
(t-2) - - - - (0.0313) - - - 
Corruption (t-3) -0.088*** -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.086*** - -0.08*** -0.115*** -0.09*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0323) (0.0302) (0.0309) - (0.0309) (0.0329) (0.0311) 
Interaction terms 
Government size (t-3) x - - - - - -0.022 - - 
Knows other entrepreneurs - - - - - (0.018) - - 
Constraints on executive - - - - - - - -0.038** 
(t-3)  xKnows other entr. - - - - - - - (0.017) 
Corruption (t-3) x - - - - - - 0.0452** - 
Knows other entrepreneurs - - - - - - (0.014) - 
 38 
Table 3  
Follow up. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Macroeconomic level control variables 
GDP growth rate (t-1) 0.0128 0.00837 0.0148 0.0138 0.0116 0.0135 0.0133 0.0134 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0139) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1)  -0.0579* -0.0671** -0.083*** - - - - - 
 (0.0311) (0.0312) (0.0293) - - - - - 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):  - - - -0.0985 -0.0126 -0.0994 -0.100 -0.0978 
iq2 - - - (0.0656) (0.0712) (0.0655) (0.0654) (0.0660) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):   - - - -0.146* -0.0337 -0.145* -0.146* -0.147* 
iq3 - - - (0.0866) (0.0917) (0.0864) (0.0863) (0.0870) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):   - - - -0.171* -0.0501 -0.170* -0.171** -0.171* 
iq4 - - - (0.0875) (0.0929) (0.0873) (0.0871) (0.0879) 
GDP per capita ppp (t-1):   - - - -0.184** -0.0475 -0.184** -0.185** -0.184** 
iq5 - - - (0.0826) (0.0847) (0.0825) (0.0823) (0.0831) 
Constant -0.381*** -0.373*** -0.367*** -0.25*** -0.37*** -0.245 -0.245 -0.245 
 (0.0445) (0.0437) (0.0436) (0.0699) (0.043) (0.07) (0.069) (0.070) 
Industrial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 8,160 
Number of country 
groups 
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Log Likelihood -9947 -9942 -9944 -9945 -9949 -9944 -9942 -9942 
Df 15 21 16 19 18 20 20 20 
Akaike Information 
Criterion 
19931.48 19934.14 19927.36 19935.6 19942.0 19936.1 19931.5 19932.9 
Random effects parameters 
sigma_u 0.097*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.08*** .086*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0198) (0.020) (0.021) (0.0221) (0.021) (0.02) (0.021) 
sigma_v 0.072*** 0.0702*** 0.072*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.0179) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
sigma_e 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; all variables with exception of dummy variables are standardised. 
Likelihood ratio test (model2 vs model1) chi2(6)=9.34; prob>chi2=0.1554. Likelihood ratio test (model3 vs  model1) chi2(6)=6.12; 
prob>chi2=0.01. 
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Figure 1. New businesses’ employment growth expectations: country effects in rank order with 95% 
confidence intervals 
 
 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006.  Note: We calculated the intercepts and confidence intervals using the set of observations without 
171 outliers (see discussion in section 3.5).  
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Figure 2.Young businesses’ Growth Expectations vis-à-vis Young business activity rate, country 
means 
 
 
 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006. Country abbreviations denote: AR – Argentina; AT – Austria; AU – Australia; BE- Belgium; 
BR- Brazil; CA- Canada; CL – Chile; CN – China; DE – Germany; DK – Denmark; ES- Spain; FI – Finland; FR – France; 
GR – Greece; HR – Croatia; HU – Hungary; IE – Ireland; IL – Israel; IN – India; IT – Italy; JM – Jamaica; JO – Jordan; JP 
– Japan; KR – South Korea; LV – Latvia;  MX – Mexico; NL – Netherlands; NO – Norway; NZ – New Zealand; PE – 
Peru; PL – Poland; PT – Portugal; RU – Russia; SE – Sweden; SG – Singapore; SI – Slovenia; SW – Switzerland; TH 
Thailand; UK – United Kingdom; US – United States;  VE  - Venezuela; ZA – South Africa. 
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Figure 3: Predictive margins of knows other entrepreneurs by executive constraints with 95 % CIs 
 
 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006. Note: knowent_dum denotes “Knows other entrepreneurs”. CI stands for confidence intervals. 
All variables with exception of dummy variables are standardised. We tested the significance of difference between the two 
categories of ‘Knows other entrepreneurs’ by contrasting the two profiles and it proved to be statistically significant. We 
tested this vice versa, also confirming that difference in marginal effects of executive constraints by “Knows other 
entrepreneurs” on growth aspirations is statistically significant. Results are available from authors upon request.     
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Figure 4. Predictive margins of knows other entrepreneurs by corruption with 95 % CIs 
 
 
 
Source: GEM 2001-2006. Note: knowent_dum denotes “Knows other entrepreneurs”. CI stands for confidence intervals. 
All variables with exception of dummy variables are standardised. We tested the significance of difference between the two 
categories of ‘Knows other entrepreneurs’ by contrasting the two profiles, and it proved to be statistically significant. We 
tested this vice versa, also confirming that difference in marginal effects of corruption by “Knows other entrepreneurs” on 
growth aspirations is statistically significant. Results are available from authors upon request.    
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